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ABSTRACT
The evolution of cooperation is one of the fundamen-
tal problems of both social sciences and biology. It is
difficult to explain how a large extent of cooperation
could evolve if individual free riding always provides
higher benefits and chances of survival. In absence of
direct reciprocation, it has been suggested that indi-
rect reciprocity could potentially solve the problem of
large scale cooperation. In this paper, we compare the
chances of two forms of indirect reciprocity with each
other: a blind one that rewards any partner who did
good to previous partners, and an embedded one that
conditions cooperation on good acts towards common
acquaintances. We show that these two versions of in-
direct reciprocal strategies are not very different from
each other in their efficiency. We also demonstrate that
their success very much relies on the speed of evolution:
their chances for survival are only present if evolution-
ary updates are not frequent. Robustness tests are pro-
vided for various forms of biases.
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of cooperative behaviour within a com-
munity of individuals is a largely studied problem (Hoff-
mann 2000; Sachs et al. 2004). The presence of kinship
relationships can explain cooperative behaviour as the
willingness to see related individuals - sharing a part
of the genetic code - thrive and reproduce (Hamilton
1964; Grafen 1984). More difficult to justify is the co-
operation among unrelated individuals.
Direct reciprocity is known to be an powerful mech-
anism for the evolution of cooperation Axelrod and
Hamilton (1981); Axelrod (1984). Direct reciprocity,
however, is difficult to justify as the only mechanism
behind high levels of cooperation in human societies,
as its efficiency strongly relies on direct knowledge and
perfect memory of past behaviour of interacting part-
ners. Previous research has uncovered various mecha-
nisms that can contribute to the establishment of co-
operation. Among others, these mechanisms include
constrained interaction on networks or spatial struc-
tures (Hauert and Doebeli 2004; Lieberman et al. 2005),
the competition among communities (Gunnthorsdottir
and Rapoport 2006; West et al. 2007; Puurtinen and
Mappes 2009), the interaction within small populations
(Dunbar 1992), the presence of negative relationships
among agents on the side of positive ones (Righi and
Taka´cs 2014) and more in general the presence of infor-
mation about peers coming through mechanisms such
as social comparison (Whitaker et al. 2016) reputation
(Sigmund 2012), image-scoring (Wedekind and Milinski
2000), gossip (Sommerfeld et al. 2007; Wu et al. 2015),
and language (Smith 2010).
Most of these mechanisms are related to the idea
of indirect reciprocity: help - or retaliation - does
not come from the interacting partners but rather
from some third individual (Boyd and Richerson 1989;
Nowak and Sigmund 1998, 2005). When interactions
are constrained on a network structure (Hauert and
Doebeli 2004), there can be at least two different op-
erationalizations of the concept of indirect reciprocity,
depending on the assumptions made about the infor-
mational flow accessible to agents.
A first type of indirect reciprocity is one where an
individual can observe the behaviour of the interacting
partners with any third individual in the population
related to the latter. In this case it is assumed that in-
formation can freely flow on the network of interactions
so that a joint connection between the indirectly recip-
rocal agents is not necessary for the information about
the behaviour of common peers to pass from the former
to the latter. Within this paper we call this blind type
of operationalization of the indirect reciprocity concept
“unconnected reciprocity” (or UR).
A second type of indirect reciprocity is only con-
cerned with the flow of information coming from peers.
Within this paper we call this embedded type of oper-
ationalization of the indirect reciprocity concept “con-
nected reciprocity” (or CR).
As this two types of indirect reciprocity rely in dif-
ferent information sets, their strength in sustaining co-
operation can differ according to the setup studied.
The objective and the innovation of this study is to
characterize and compare the effectiveness of these two
types of indirect reciprocity strategies. We analyze the
chances of the two types of indirect reciprocity to sup-
port the evolution of cooperation under different condi-
tions, in particular under network dynamics, in relation
to the extent of forgiveness, and to the speed of strategy
evolution.
THE MODEL
We consider a model with N agents placed on a non-
weighted and non-directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph with a
given density d. Every agent i ∈ N is characterized by
a strategy type and by a set of connections with a sub-
set of the whole population F ti ⊂ N . Each time step,
the two-person single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is
played once by each individual with each of her net-
work connections. The agents play the PD, character-
ized by the classical payoff structure Temptation(T ) >
Reward(R) > Punishment(P ) > Sucker(S), with
each of their neighbors. Specifically, for the sake of
the simulations hereby discussed we fix the value of the
payoffs to T = 5, R = 3, P = 1 and S = 0 as in Axelrod
(1984). We consider the following four strategies:
• Unconditional Defection (UD): this type of agent al-
ways defects regardless of the behaviour or character-
istics of the interaction partners.
• Unconditional Cooperation (UC): this type of agent
always cooperates regardless of the behaviour or char-
acteristics of the interaction partners.
• Unconnected Reciprocity (UR): this type of agent re-
ciprocates the last action of the interacting partner with
a randomly selected connection of the latter (i.e. some
z ∈ F tj ). 1
• Connected Reciprocity (CR): this type of agent recip-
rocates the last action of the interacting partner with
a randomly selected common connection (i.e. some
z ∈ F ti ∧ F tj ). 2
1If there is no previous action to observe than the UR acts
randomly, with 50% chance of cooperation.
2If there is no previous action to observe than the CR acts
randomly, with 50% chance of cooperation.
During every dyadic interaction, agents can observe
the past behaviour of the partner with all his connec-
tions and play according to their type. One key dif-
ference between the CR and the UR strategy is that
the former can only get information to condition its
behaviour from closed triads, while the latter can also
condition its choice on the behaviour of individuals un-
connected with him.
Time is divided in discrete periods and simulations
run until a stable equilibrium is reached or 10000 peri-
ods have passed. At each time step t, each agent i con-
temporaneously plays the PD with all agents his first
order social neighborhood, i.e. with each j ∈ Fi ob-
serving all actions performed by others in t−1. Agents
of type UR and CR, when observing their partners’
actions may observe defection; in this case –with prob-
ability Pfor – they may decide to give the partner an-
other opportunity and observe another of his actions.
This simulates the fact that individuals may forgive a
defection act. At the end of the interaction phase, each
individual computes his average payoff from all his in-
teractions and compares it with that of peers in the
direct neighborhood (i.e, with all those he has played
with). With probability Pevo the individual changes its
strategy into the one of the best performing partner.3
Hence, the evolutionary strategy we apply is the “copy
the best” update rule.
Network dynamics. Following hints of previous
research (Santos et al. 2006), network dynamics may
provide favorable conditions for the evolution of co-
operation. For this reason it is important to observe
its impact on the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity
strategies on cooperation. In this model, each of ties
of each individuals F ti can be subject to rewiring, with
some probability at each time step. We consider three
mechanisms of network update.
• With probability Pntw a selected connection is
rewired to another agent selected uniformly at random
from the population.
• With probability Popen a selected connection is
rewired so to open a closed triad incident on that par-
ticular edge.
• With probability Pclose the rewiring is done by clos-
ing a triad that was open.
The three probabilities are extracted independently
– for each link – at each time step. For this reason
the sign of the difference Popen − Pclose indicates the
propensity of the network clustering to increase (nega-
tive signs of the difference) or decrease (positive signs
of the difference) over time.
Outcome Measures. We explore our model run-
ning a large number of simulations (1000 for the sim-
ulations proposed here) and by studying the statisti-
cal relationship between the outcome variables and the
various parameters. This type of analysis is chosen to
explore a complex model with many different parame-
ters extensively. As outcome variables, the number of
CR and the number of UR strategies are used alongside
3In case of ties, one of the partners with the highest payoff is
selected randomly
with the proportion of cooperative acts. Populations of
200 agents are studied for a large number of time pe-
riods (10,000) or until the whole population of agents
becomes of the same type so that no further evolution
is possible. We define this latter moment tconv. Since
the model characteristics do not guarantee the conver-
gence of the population to a single strategy, to describe
evolutionary success, we define a strategy to gain
• Absolute dominance: if each individual in the
population ends up playing the strategy or if – when
tmax = 10000 is reached – this strategy has been
adopted by more than 90% of the individuals.
• Relative dominance: if tmax = 10, 000 is reached
and this strategy is adopted by the relative majority of
individuals.
Obviously, the second mode of dominance should be
computed only for those cases where no convergence
to a single strategy has been achieved. Most of our
results show a quasi-certain convergence on one type of
strategy. Therefore, except when otherwise noted, we
will refer to the concept of absolute dominance in the
discussion of our results.
In addition, the proportion of cooperative acts is
computed at tconv or tmax (in case of non-convergence).
RESULTS
Indirect reciprocity strategies and coopera-
tion. We start by running 1000 simulations consid-
ering a population that is initially equally divided be-
tween the four types of strategies: UC, UD, CR and
UR. N = 200 agents are laid on a random network
with density d = 0.2. 4 For each single simulation the
values of Pevo (the strategy evolution probability), Pntw
(probability of random network change), Pfor (proba-
bility of forgiveness), Popen (probability to open each
triad at each step) and Pclose (probability to close each
triad at each step) are extracted uniformly and inde-
pendently from uniform distributions between 0 and 1.
Figure 1 shows that cooperation rarely disappears
completely. On the opposite, for the majority of the
simulations, the final proportion of cooperators is above
zero. This implies that, for the largest part of possible
parameter combinations, unconditional defection is un-
able to completely eliminate other types of strategies.
The proportion of simulations with a share of cooperat-
ing acts larger than 1/2, however, is smaller, indicating
that cooperation seldom becomes the action adopted
by the majority of agents. It is interesting to note the
sharp drop in the frequency of cooperation around a
proportion 1/2, indicating that while the strategies of
indirect reciprocity survive, cooperation seldom gains
relative dominance.
Table I reports that UD was dominant in 83% of the
simulations in which a strategy gained absolute domi-
nance. As expected, UC never gained absolute domi-
nance. More remarkable is the significant presence of
4The size and density of the network are calibrated throughout
the article to resemble that of human ancestors’ communities, in
line with Dunbar (1992). Moreover from the technical viewpoint
the relatively high density almost surely ensures the absence of
isolates.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of proportion of cooperation actions at
tconv . Results from 1000 simulations with populations initially
equally divided among the four types of strategies. The value of
Pevo, Pntw, Pfor, Popen and Pclose are selected randomly and
independently from a distribution between 0 an 1.
instances in which CR and UR became dominant in
the simulations that resulted in a single winner strat-
egy. Indeed, about 10% of these runs ended up with
the dominance of the CR strategy, while 7% of them
terminated with the win of the UR strategy. Since the
parameter space explored is quite large and contains
parameter combinations very hostile to the emergence
of cooperation, the relatively small success of indirect
reciprocity strategies is noteworthy. Furthermore, the
high standard deviation observed around the average
number of individuals adopting a strategy at the end
of a simulation indicates the potential presence of very
different outcomes.
Blind indirect reciprocity and cooperation. In
order to understand the comparative strength of blind
and embedded indirect reciprocal strategies, it is con-
venient to study separately the cases where only one of
them is present alongside the baseline strategies of UD
and UC. We run 1000 simulations with initial popula-
tions equally divided among UDs, UCs and URs and
with Pevo, Pntw, Pfor, Popen, and Pclose extracted uni-
formly and independently from uniform distributions
between 0 and 1. As Figure 2 (Left Panel) shows, the
final number of URs has a bimodal distribution. In
many cases, UR disappears and the population is pro-
gressively dominated by UD. In others, the UR strat-
egy becomes the absolutely dominant one, spreading
to the whole population. Simulations characterized by
the survival of UR as a non dominant strategy are very
rare. The Left Panel of Figure 2 (Left Panel) explores
the outcomes for different probabilities of forgiveness
Pfor and clearly shows that UD has the potential to be-
come the absolute dominant strategy under any level of
forgiveness. The Right Panel of Figure 2 (Right Panel)
shows how the proportion of cooperation increases in
cases dominated by the UR strategy with higher levels
of forgiveness Pfor. Notice that not all cases where UR
gains dominance are characterized by cooperative be-
havior. Blind indirect reciprocity often leaves a blind
eye for an eye.
Strategy
type
%Abs. Dom. Avg. num. Std Num min max
UD 83% 115.59 98.68 0 200
UC 0 % 0.12 1.35 0 26
CR 10% 13.49 49.40 0 200
UR 7% 10.26 43.31 0 200
TABLE I: Characteristics of simulations absolutely dominated by a strategy. Notes: Columns show the proportion of these runs in
which each strategy gained absolute dominance, the average number, the standard deviation, the minimum, and the maximum number
of agents playing that strategy across these simulation runs. All simulations start from a population equally divided among the four
types of strategies. The values of Pevo, Pntw, Pfor, Popen and Pclose are selected randomly and independently from a distribution
between 0 and 1.
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Fig. 2. Left Panel: Number of URs at the end of the simulation. Right Panel: Proportion of cooperative actions at the end of the
simulation. Both panels represent the relevant variable against the level of Pfor associated with the simulation. In all 1000 shown
simulations the population is initially equally divided between UD, UC and UR strategies, while Pevo, Pntw, Pfor, Popen, and Pclose
are extracted uniformly at random between 0 and 1.
Let us now study the relationship between the per-
fectness or the speed of evolution and the chances of
blind indirect reciprocity. We find that faster evolu-
tionary dynamics is associated with lower chances for
the survival of cooperative behaviour. Indeed, the Left
Panel of Figure 3 shows that fast evolution completely
eliminates the UR strategy: when the speed of evo-
lution is too high the UR strategy cannot adapt fast
enough to the defecting behaviour of UDs and disap-
pears consequentially. Observing the Right Panel of
Figure 3 it is immediately evident that the maximum
level of cooperation achievable by UR strategies de-
creases in the speed of evolution, after the latter starts
to exceed the threshold Pevo = 0.2. Above this thresh-
old the strategy is unable to sustain the absolute dom-
inance of cooperation.5
To conclude our analysis of UR strategies, we now
study statistically the level of dominance of this strat-
egy in relation to our key parameter values. For this,
we discretize the number of URs at the end of the sim-
ulation creating a variable catUR that is assigned value
1 if the population of UR strategies is larger than 100,
and value of 0 otherwise. We then run a probit regres-
sion using catUR as the dependent variable and the
value of the parameters Pevo, Pntw, Pfor, Popen, and
Pclose as independent variables. Results are reported
5The value of 1/2 at Pevo = 1 is due to the constant updating
of strategies that start with a 50% probability of cooperation.
catUR Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z|
Pevo -1.351303 .3076922 -4.39 0.000
Pntw -.4261091 .2804871 -1.52 0.129
Pfor .6986143 .2758046 -2.53 0.011
Popen -.2280673 .2728396 0.84 0.403
Pclose -.1347793 .2696162 -0.50 0.617
Const. -1.451655 .3154203 -4.60 0.000
TABLE II: Probit regression of the number of URs at the end
of each simulation (discretized as discussed in the main text) on
key parameter values.
in Table II.
Table II shows that, as suggested qualitatively by
Figure 3, Pevo has a strong negative effect (with a p–
value lower than 0.01) on the chances of UR to be-
come dominant. On the contrary – and again in line
with our qualitative findings, – forgiveness has a posi-
tive and significant effect on the chances of UR to be-
come dominant. Finally, Pntw, Popen and Pclose have
non-significant coefficients. This implies that the vari-
ations in the parameters of network dynamics do not
affect significantly the outcomes discussed. The lack of
significance of these parameters can be interpreted as
a sign of the robustness of the conclusions reached on
the conditions that sustain the emergence of coopera-
tion through blind indirect reciprocity.
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Fig. 3. Left Panel: Number of URs at the end of the simulation. Right Panel: Proportion of cooperative actions at the end of the
simulation. Both panels represent the relevant variable against the level of Pevo associated with the simulation. In all 1000 shown
simulations the population is initially equally divided between UD, UC and UR strategies while Pevo, Pntw, Pfor, Popen, and Pclose are
extracted uniformly at random between 0 and 1.
Embedded indirect reciprocity and coopera-
tion. We run a set of 1000 simulations with initial
populations equally divided among UDs, UCs and CRs.
Pevo, Pntw, Pfor, Popen, and Pclose are all extracted uni-
formly and independently from uniform distributions
between 0 and 1. As Figure 4 (Left Panel) shows, the
general relationship between the number of CR strat-
egy registered at the end of the simulation and Pfor is
in line with the one observed in Figure 2 for UR: the
majority of simulations ended up with the dominance of
UD, but some with the dominance of the CR strategy.
The Right Panel of Figure 4 highlights, however, an in-
teresting difference concerning the levels of cooperation
that can be sustained. For low levels of the Pfor pa-
rameter, while CR can become dominant, it does so by
mimicking the UD strategy, thus the whole population
acts as defectors. Only when Pfor > 0.4, cooperation
grows significantly, eventually reaching absolute domi-
nance. This is in contrast with what is observed for UR
that sustains high levels of cooperation also for lower
levels of forgiveness. This difference is due to the under-
lying difference between the CR and the UR strategies.
Indeed, blind indirect reciprocity (UR) has potentially
access to a larger number of individuals as a potential
source of information for conditioning its behaviour to-
ward the interacting partner. On the contrary, CR is
restricted to interact with common partners (F tj ∧F ti ),
and hence forgiveness provides less additional advan-
tages for its success.
Figure 5 shows that the speed of evolution is not fa-
vorable for the embedded indirect reciprocity strategy.
Despite the broad similarity with Figure 3, there are
two notable differences. First, CR can become domi-
nant somewhat more likely than UR with fast strategy
evolution. Second, the number of simulations in which
a high level of cooperation is sustained is somewhat
higher in Figure 5, but drops to zero sharply around
Pevo = 0.4. In contrast, Figure 3 displays a progres-
sive decrease by the speed of evolution, but with more
internal variation. The reason for this slight difference
is - again - the different set of information accessible
catCR Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z|
Pevo -1.144433 .3030948 -3.78 0.000
Pntw .1400632 .2657115 -0.53 0.598
Pfor .9659768 .2868299 -3.37 0.001
Popen .3467598 .2707578 1.28 0.200
Pclose -.0308959 .2661878 -0.12 0.908
Const. -2.073514 .3350006 -6.19 0.000
TABLE III: Probit regression of the number of CRs at the end
of each simulation (discretized as discussed in the main text) on
parameter values assumed by each of the model parameters.
to the two indirectly reciprocal strategies. The results
show that the larger, but sparser, network of informa-
tion accessible to UR allows for faster adaptation to
defecting behaviour than the tight but smaller network
of CR, thus allowing for higher levels of cooperation to
be sustained for 0.4 < Pevo < 1.
We finally run a statistical analysis of the level of
dominance of CR in relation to key parameter values.
Similarly to the UR case, we discretized the number of
CRs at the end of the simulation creating a variable
catCR that - for each simulation - takes value 1 if the
number of CR is larger than 100 and value 0 otherwise.
We then run a probit regression using catCR as depen-
dent variable and parameters Pevo, Pntw, Pfor, Popen,
and Pclose as independent variables.
Results are reported in Table III which confirms our
qualitative results also for CR. The chances of CR to
become dominant are shown to decrease significantly
in Pevo and significantly increase in Pfor. Both results
have very high levels of significance with p ≤ 0.001.
Finally, the parameters associated with Pclose, Popen,
and Pntw are not significant. This is reassuring
about the robustness of our findings under different
parametrizations of the network dynamics.
CONCLUSIONS
Against rational interests and equilibrium predic-
tions, humans display a high extent of cooperation, also
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Fig. 4. Left Panel: Number of CRs at the end of the simulation. Right Panel: Proportion of cooperative actions at the end of the
simulation. Both panels represent the relevant variable against the level of Pfor associated with the simulation. In all 1000 simulations
the population is initially equally divided between UD, UC and CR strategies while Pevo, Pntw, Pfor, Popen, and Pclose are extracted
uniformly at random between 0 and 1.
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
N
um
R
ec
Co
nn
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Pevo
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
pr
op
_c
oo
p
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Pevo
Fig. 5. Left Panel: Number of CRs at the end of the simulation. Right Panel: Proportion of cooperative actions at tconv or at tmax.
Both panels represent the relevant variable against the level of Pevo associated with the simulation. In all 1000 simulations the population
is initially equally divided between UD, UC and CR strategies while Pevo, Pntw, Pfor, Popen, and Pclose extracted uniformly at random
between 0 and 1.
against strangers. Previous research has suggested that
indirect reciprocity might explain substantial coopera-
tion levels. The objective of this study was to assess
the effectiveness of two different types of indirect reci-
procity strategies in their capacity to sustain coopera-
tion. We modeled interactions between agents with the
two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), which is the most
puzzling and best studied social dilemma situation. In
our model, agents represented humans interacting on
a random and developing network. We implemented
three mechanisms of network change and examined the
chances of cooperation by two different types of indi-
rect reciprocity strategies under a full range of combi-
nations. Precisely, we assumed different combinations
of random rewiring of ties, a mechanism of opening
triads (creating structural holes), and a mechanism of
closing triads (increasing clustering).
Network relations were crucial for our model, because
these connections provided agents with the opportunity
to condition their actions on the information they re-
ceived from and about network partners. We studied
two forms of indirect reciprocity: a blind one that re-
wards any partner who did good to previous partners,
and an embedded one that conditions cooperation on
good acts towards common acquaintances.
Our results show that both strategies sustain simi-
lar levels of cooperation in situations characterized by
the presence of unconditional defectors. Moreover, for
both strategies their success depend strongly and neg-
atively on the speed of evolution for strategies. In con-
texts characterized by fast evolution, both strategies
are dominated by defection and disappear or become
functionally equivalent to unconditional defectors, thus
surviving by always defecting. Forgiveness – the proba-
bility of indirectly reciprocal strategies to give a second
opportunity to defecting partners by observing their
behaviour with a second partner – is shown to have
a positive effect on the capacity of both strategies to
sustain cooperation.
While the two types of indirect reciprocity strategies
share similar patterns of behaviour, our analysis also
uncovered differences in their efficiency. First, the blind
indirectly reciprocal strategy (UR) supports relatively
higher levels of cooperation even at low levels of for-
giveness. The embedded indirect reciprocity strategy
needs a higher probability to offer a second chance to
sustain the same level of cooperation. Second, the em-
bedded indirect reciprocity strategy (CR) is unable to
sustain cooperation when strategies evolve fast while,
in some cases, the blind strategy could overcome the
pressure provided by the high speed of evolution. The
reason for these differences can be attributed to the dif-
ferent set of information accessible to the two indirectly
reciprocal strategies. Indeed, the blind strategy can ac-
cess a broader network to condition its behaviour and
thus can adapt its behaviour fast and acquire more in-
formation through forgiveness. The embedded strategy
relies only on a smaller set of common partners, thus
the acquired information is more local and less diverse,
making it more difficult to discern pure defectors and
other conditional players.
A limitation of our study is that we studied rel-
atively small networks, in which indirect reciprocity
might be less important than direct forms of reciprocity.
Furthermore, small populations might also be prone
to drift-like behavior resulting in local equilibria that
would not be feasible in larger populations. However,
we selected the relatively small network size because
this corresponds better to the natural size of human
groups, in the evolutionary past in particular. Our re-
sults are shown to be robust to even strong changes
in the mechanisms of network dynamics underlying the
interactions among the agents.
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